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Toward a Critical Housing Studies Research Agenda on Platform Real Estate 
 
Abstract: The pace and scope of digital innovation targeting the real estate industry has 
intensified over the past decade. This article is therefore concerned with the digitization of the 
residential real estate industry, and how critical housing scholars might shape a research 
agenda on this transformation. We set out platform logic, digital labor, and financialization as a 
conceptual vocabulary for studying new digital modalities of real estate practice. Platform logic 
highlights questions of power and politics relating to the data collection capacities potentially 
obscured by platforms’ convenience and ease of use. Digital labor points to how platform real 
estate may change relationships among incumbent real estate professionals, investors and 
property owners, and tenants and residents. Financialization shifts the focus to how digital 
platforms participate in the contemporary political economy of housing. The article concludes 
with an agenda for critical housing research on digital real estate platforms.     
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Introduction 
The social scientific study of digital phenomena long ago moved past understanding the Internet 
as an “e-elsewhere” (Ford 2003, 148), instead emphasizing how digital technologies are 
embedded in a “network of social, cultural, and economic relationships that crisscrosses and 
exceeds the Internet” (Terranova 2013, 34). Contemporary social scientists understand the 
digital in terms of the role human agency and material infrastructures play in the design and 
use of digital technologies; how digital experiences are contextually situated and embodied in 
‘real’ space; the politics involved in networked space; and the interweaving of digital networks, 
real—and urban—space, and subjectivities (Ash, Kitchin, and Leszczynski 2016; J. Cohen 
2007; Gandy 2005; Haraway 1990). As part of how we use and interact with space, the digital 
is materially grounded in everyday life and inseparable from the power relations therein 
(Graham, Zook, and Boulton 2013; Bar 2001; Kling, Rosenbaum, and Sawyer 2005).  
 
Because housing is a crucial vector of social and spatial inequality and thus of contentious 
power dynamics, the impact of digital technologies on residential real estate demands close 
study. While digital technology is not new to the real estate industry (see for example Sawyer 
et al. 2003), the pace and scope of innovation targeting the industry has intensified over the 
past decade (Baum 2017). This intensification is associated with a wave of recent technological 
advances including cloud and mobile computing and the growing prominence of the platform 
business model (discussed shortly), which has been strongly backed by venture capital 
investment (Langley and Leyshon 2017). Global venture capital funding into real estate 
technology companies has grown substantially in recent years, achieving 63% annual 
compound growth between 2012 and 2017 and reaching £8.5 billion in 2017 by one recent 
estimate (Ivens and Barbiroglio 2018, cited in Shaw 2018). Going much further than property 
listings, real estate technology companies are rolling out an array of digital platforms—primarily 
encountered as apps on smartphones and tablet computers or as websites—including 
construction management, home insurance, home sales, property valuation, and property 
management (Griffith 2018; Perry 2018).  
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Such technologies are changing the capitalist relations of real estate (Koh, Wissink, and Forrest 
2016; Sumption and Hooper 2014; Shaw 2018), rescaling notions of place (Gurran and Phibbs 
2017), reconfiguring the terrain of cities (Atkinson 2016; Ley 2017), increasing the volume and 
velocity of real estate data (Rogers 2017a), changing tenancy management practices (Fields 
2019a), and facilitating mobilities of real estate consumers and capital (Tseng 2000; Robertson 
and Rogers 2017). The ability to derive value from real estate data drives efforts to accumulate 
and trade such data, and link it to other data sources (Rogers 2017b; Sadowski 2019). 
However, housing studies has been slow to generate a coherent agenda around digital real 
estate technologies. This article is therefore concerned with the digitization of the residential 
real estate industry, and how critical housing scholars might approach this transformation to 
shape a research agenda.  
 
Taking inspiration from work in information studies (Sawyer, Crowston, and Wigand 2014; 
Sawyer, Wigand, and Crowston 2005), business and management (Dixon et al. 2005), and 
geography (Shaw 2018), we argue a digital research agenda for housing studies must eschew 
technological determinism in favor of sensitivity to the interrelations between the digital and the 
wider forces that influence its role in changing the real estate industry. For example, Sawyer 
and colleagues (2014) show that while the introduction of information communication 
technologies (ICTs) has changed the work of U.S. real estate agents, who now routinely rely 
on a wide range of digital technologies (including smartphones, digital lock boxes, email, and 
photos and videos) and data, this process has unfolded in highly personalized and 
indeterminate ways due to the embeddedness of real estate work in social relations.  
 
We offer a series of entry points for housing researchers to conceptualize new digital modalities 
of real estate practice. We suggest these can be translated into analytic tools to study how a 
specific set of digital technologies—namely, platforms—reshape the operation of power within 
housing markets, modify relationships among real estate stakeholders, and bear upon the 
political economy of housing. In line with a socio-technical perspective, we do not take these 
outcomes as given, but as emergent and shaped within specific social, spatial, and 
organizational contexts (see also Shaw, 2018). That is, digital technologies are not merely 
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technical—nor can they ever be neutral, because the power relations that determine who 
shapes and benefits from platforms, algorithms, and models are profoundly uneven (see for 
example Daniels 2013; Eubanks 2018; Leszczynski 2016; Noble 2018). For the purposes of 
this article, we concentrate on platforms designed for housing search, sales and acquisition, 
and leasing and management. We focus particularly on platforms geared toward investors, 
professionals, and tenants—including the broader ecosystem of ‘big data’, algorithms and 
analytics used to facilitate residential real estate management and investment. Following Shaw 
(2018) we use the term ‘platform real estate’ to designate these digital real estate technologies.  
 
The article is structured as follows. The second section provides an overview of digital platforms 
and the platform business model, and outlines an emergent typology of platforms for property 
trading, operations, and data. Our analysis draws selectively on case studies from this typology. 
Sections three through five approach the question of how we might analyze platform real estate 
from the vantage points of “platform logic” (Andersson Schwarz 2017), digital labor, and 
financialization. While these are not the only perspectives from which platform real estate may 
be analyzed, they point to key questions and issues for critical housing studies.  
 
Understanding digital real estate technologies in terms of platform logic points to questions of 
power and politics relating to the data collection capacities of platforms, capacities that 
platforms’ convenience and ease of use may obscure. Deploying a digital labor theory of data 
value can show how platform real estate is poised to change relationships among incumbent 
real estate professionals, investors and property owners, and tenants and residents as digital 
technologies facilitate longstanding dynamics of capitalist production and exploitation. 
Financialization shifts the focus to how digital platforms participate in the contemporary political 
economy of housing. We conclude the article by outlining a potential research agenda on digital 
real estate technologies that emphasizes classification and calculation, data as capital (cf. 
Sadowski 2019), the potential restructuring of real estate industry professional roles, and the 
political economy of real estate platforms. 
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Toward a typology of real estate platforms 
The digital architectures known as platforms emerged in the mid-2000s as web services like 
YouTube and Facebook allowed web users to not only consume, but also to generate 
content, and to interact and share information with each other (Barns in press). This 
development inaugurated a switch away from ‘one to many’ communication (as seen in 
traditional radio and television for example) toward ‘many to many’ communication, exchange, 
and participation (Barns in press, 7). The permeability of the platform ecosystem is the key to 
their ability to efficiently connect different user groups, whose interaction makes value 
exchange possible. Opening up platforms like Facebook and Google Maps to third party 
applications was crucial to the development of the platform-as-marketplace. This move 
enables platforms to benefit from outside innovation, drawing activity, users, and revenue 
while still retaining control (particularly over the valuable data collected through use) (Barns in 
press; Srnicek 2017). 
 
The terminology of platform ‘users’ thus refers less to consumers than to “producers and 
creators of value and generators of data” (Langley and Leyshon, 2017, 7). User interaction is 
at the core of the platform business strategy and the tendency for platforms to “constantly 
morph and evolve” (Barns in press, 10) to add value. Zillow exemplifies this plasticity, starting 
as a real estate listing website in 2006 that by 2019 developed into a multi-function 
advertising, rental management (Zillow Rental Manager), and home buying (Zillow Offers) 
platform, with plans to build a mortgage lending business as well (Levy 2019). To summarize, 
platforms operate as multi-sided markets: the technology works as an intermediary, 
organizing connections between market agents, e.g. between buyers and sellers (eBay), 
drivers and riders (Uber), hosts and guests (Airbnb) and seeking to leverage network effects, 
i.e. to add value through increasing the number of users and their engagement with the 
platform, often by pivoting to (or adding) new business models (Langley and Leyshon 2017; 
Srnicek, 2017).  
 
Platforms have significantly changed some established industries, most notably the taxi and 
hotel industries via Uber and Airbnb respectively. However beyond attention to the role of 
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Airbnb in kickstarting and accelerating gentrification, and compounding rental price pressures 
in some cities (see Gurran and Phibbs 2017; Wachsmuth et al. 2017), public and academic 
debates about real estate and digital economic circulation is limited. This oversight limits our 
ability to understand the social and geographical significance of a wave of digital platforms 
designed to facilitate investment in residential real estate both within nation-states and across 
international borders (Dal Maso et al. 2019). An inventory of these developments is beyond 
the scope of this article. We provide here a highly selective typology1 to indicate some of the 
key ways in which the digital is transforming real estate investment through residential real 
estate trading, operations, and data platforms (see table 1 for an overview of platforms 
discussed in this article).  
 
Technology and real estate terminology for such advances is often called ‘proptech’ or 
‘realtech’ (see Baum, 2017; Maarbani, 2017). However, as Shaw (2018) argues, this 
terminology can be both definitionally muddy and technologically essentialist. The term 
‘platform real estate’ better encapsulates the connective capacities and paths of action related 
to ownership, use, and exchange of land and buildings (Shaw, 2018) afforded by the digital 
advances we focus on in this article. 
 
A large number of trading platforms for buying and selling real estate connect property owners 
with customers, enabling remote investment in which both parties may potentially be 
geographically distant from the property itself. Since about 2012 several platforms have 
emerged within the US that offer the capability for online end-to-end transactions. Platforms 
including Roofstock, HomeUnion, Entera, and Opendoor variously connect buyers, sellers, 
brokers, and agents to facilitate everything from searching for homes and listing properties for 
sale to submitting bids, negotiating offers, and completing sales. Juwai is a transnational and 
cross-cultural “knowledge enterprise and data broker” (Robertson and Rogers 2017, 2401) 
platform hosted in China that connects middle-class and super-rich Chinese investors with 
sales agents in Australia, North America, and Europe to enable cross-border and cross-cultural 
 
1 We expect further scholarship on digital real estate technologies to substantially extend this initial 
survey of platform real estate; indeed Shaw (2018) has already begun to do so.    
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residential real estate purchases (Dal Maso et al. 2019). Targeting both institutional and small-
scale investors, trading platforms frequently list properties in terms of investment criteria such 
as yield and rents, and are often enriched with features like custom valuation algorithms and 
proprietary bid optimization tools. 
 
Operational platforms allow investors to outsource or automate many aspects of the rental and 
property management process (Fields 2019a). In the context of remote property transactions, 
such platforms fulfill a need to market, lease, and manage real estate at a distance from the 
product. Operational platforms mediate between property owners, tenants, and vendors (e.g. 
contractors). Some, such as US-based OneRent, cover the entire property management 
process, but many are designed for discrete aspects of operations such as leasing, 
maintenance, or evictions, and can be combined as needed. For example, RentBerry, based in 
the US but now operating internationally in high-pressure rental markets such as London, 
functions as a platform where prospective tenants negotiate rents with landlords, and also 
automates other aspects of the rental process such as tenant screening and rent collection. 
TaskEasy, a platform for exterior home maintenance (e.g. snow removal, lawn care), links US-
based property owners with contractors. Through the ClickNotices platform, owners of US 
apartment buildings are able to connect with legal professionals in order to outsource and 
automate evictions. Crucially, operational platforms also collect data that may be used to refine 
investment and asset management strategies, including relationships with tenants and 
vendors. 
 
A host of tech-powered data and property valuation solutions fill out the platform real estate 
ecosystem for housing. These services aim to provide comprehensive data on local property 
markets on a national or international basis, and analyze markets with artificial intelligence, 
machine learning and big data. In the US, HouseCanary works as a super multi-sided market, 
connecting investors, agents, appraisers, and lenders with a nationwide dataset and predictive 
analytics of property values at the city, post-code, block, and property scale. In Australia, 
Domain.com.au and RealEstate.com.au interface between buyers, property managers, agents, 
appraisers, and financial institutions, providing market intelligence to estimate sales prices and 
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set rents, and offering property and neighborhood reports. Data platforms for residential real 
estate offer more continuous market monitoring than traditional real estate data, which is often 
reported on a quarterly basis and (in the US) is notoriously fragmented or ‘dirty’, i.e. incomplete, 
containing outdated or duplicate information, or otherwise inaccurate or inconsistent. 
 
While inevitably incomplete, this initial typology of trading, operational, and data platforms 
highlights the range of digital real estate services now available to housing investors, 
consumers, and professionals. Furthermore, the majority of these platforms are situated in the 
regions we work within, namely the US and the Asia-Pacific. This is not necessarily an accurate 
reflection of the geography of residential platform real estate, which is being developed in and 
for a range of housing markets globally, including, inter alia, South Africa (Sethi 2017), Germany 
(where Berlin is a hub for startup culture, e.g. McCarthy 2018), and the UK (Carey, Jee, and 
Macaulay 2018). Further research should thus explore platform real estate in a wider range of 
contexts, adapt the conceptual tools we outline here, and propose new approaches for 
understanding digital real estate technologies beyond our case study sites, including peripheral 
and emerging economies in the global South and post-socialist states. We now introduce 
platform logic, digital labor, and financialization as three perspectives by which housing 
researchers may critically study platform real estate. 
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Table 1: Real estate platforms 
 
 Primary function(s) Headquarters 
Trading platforms 
Compass 
https://www.compass.com/ 
 
Buy, sell, and rent residential 
real estate 
New York City (United 
States) 
Entera 
https://www.entera.ai/ 
 
Buy single-family properties 
to rent or fix and flip  
San Francisco, 
California (United 
States) 
HomeUnion 
https://www.homeunion.com/ 
 
Buy single-family rental 
properties  
Irvine, California 
(United States) 
Juwai 
https://www.juwai.com/ 
  
Facilitating overseas 
investment in residential real 
estate by Chinese buyers 
Shanghai and Hong 
Kong (China) 
Opendoor 
https://www.opendoor.com/ 
 
Sell, buy, or trade in owner-
occupied homes or 
investment properties 
San Francisco, 
California (United 
States) 
Roofstock 
https://www.roofstock.com/ 
 
Buy and sell occupied single-
family rental properties  
Oakland, California  
(United States) 
Operational platforms 
Biddwell 
https://www.biddwell.com/ 
 
Rental rate negotiation for 
residential properties 
Vancouver, British 
Columbia (Canada) 
ClickNotices 
https://www.clicknotices.com/ 
 
Delinquency management 
and landlord-tenant case 
management  
Annapolis, Maryland 
(United States) 
Mynd 
https://www.mynd.co/ 
 
Residential rental property 
management 
Oakland, California  
(United States) 
OneRent 
https://www.onerent.co/ 
 
Residential rental property 
management 
San Jose, California 
(United States) 
RentBerry 
https://rentberry.com/ 
 
Rental rate negotiation for 
residential properties 
San Francisco, 
California (United 
States) 
Rently 
https://use.rently.com/ 
 
Self-viewing of residential 
rental properties 
Los Angeles, 
California (United 
States) 
SMS Assist 
https://www.smsassist.com/ 
 
Multisite property 
management for retail, 
residential, financial services, 
and restaurants 
Chicago, Illinois 
(United States) 
TaskEasy 
https://www.taskeasy.com/ 
 
Lawn care and exterior 
maintenance for businesses 
and homeowners 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(United States) 
Data platforms 
HouseCanary 
https://www.housecanary.com/ 
 
Valuation and analytics for 
residential real estate 
San Francisco, 
California (United 
States) 
Domain 
https://www.domain.com.au/ 
 
Property data and marketing 
for residential real estate 
Sydney, New South 
Wales (Australia) 
RealEsate.com.au 
https://www.realestate.com.au/ 
 
Research and market 
insights for residential real 
estate 
Melbourne, Victoria 
(Australia) 
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Conceptual entry point 1: Platform logic   
Drawing on the notion of platform logic advanced by Andersson Schwarz (2017) focuses our 
attention on matters of control, corporate dominance, and the profit driven platform’s drive for 
capital accumulation. These matters can be obscured by the technical affordances of “efficacy, 
convenience, and generativity” we have come to associate with digital platforms (Andersson 
Schwarz 2017, 5). Despite the social and economic possibilities platforms entail, the interplay 
of code-based control at the scale of individual platforms and the cumulative social effects of 
platforms writ large (Andersson Schwarz 2017) demands critical study so as to better 
understand the operation of power and politics accompanying the integration of platforms into 
everyday life. Whereas Schwarz (2017) highlights questions of geopolitical power associated 
with a handful of the largest corporate platforms, here we are concerned with platform real 
estate as part of the wider ‘information dragnet’ (Fourcade and Healy, 2017) by which data is 
harvested and analyzed for the purpose of capital accumulation and social ordering (Beer 2017; 
Fourcade and Healy 2013; Sadowski 2019). 
 
In terms of possibilities, platforms provide a digital infrastructure that intermediates between at 
least two, and often more, user groups, so that actors on either side of a transaction or 
interaction can find one another (Langley and Leyshon 2017; Srnicek 2017). In other words, 
platforms bring together users, effectively allowing them to create markets, or enfold existing 
markets into digital infrastructure (Srnicek 2017); in the case of real estate, these market 
sectors include finance and capital investment, residential real estate, commercial real estate, 
and management (Shaw, 2018). But platforms are not merely utilities facilitating interaction: 
they set the rules of connectivity, and in so doing “platforms intervene”, shaping markets and 
market interactions (Gillespie 2015, 1; Langley and Leyshon 2017; Andersson Schwarz 2017; 
Srnicek 2017). 
 
It is important to bring into the foreground that platform real estate revolves around the profit 
objectives associated with the capitalist ownership and exchange of space (Shaw, 2018). As 
such, real estate platforms are likely to intervene on behalf of the interests of investors, 
landlords, and property owners. For example, Rentberry, a “global home rental platform” 
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(Rentberry, 2018) started in high-demand markets like San Francisco, is an operational 
platform that helps prospective tenants and landlords find each other. Or, as the company 
states in its profile on startup listing service AngelList (2017), “we unite tenants and landlords 
in one closed-loop rental platform”. Landlords use Rentberry to create listings with a suggested 
rent. The platform then markets listings, screens tenants, facilitates contract signings, and 
collects rent and maintenance requests. Prospective tenants use RentBerry to submit an offer 
for rent and security deposit; like eBay the platform notifies them when they are outbid, and 
they can increase their offer in response. Landlords choose the winning bid. RentBerry offers 
automation of many aspects of the rental process and transparency of demand for rental units 
on the platform.  
  
In relation to the rules of connectivity set by Rentberry, the promise of automation and 
transparency depend on the condition that use of the platform automatically creates data: 
platform operators enjoy “privileged access to record” (Srnicek 2017, 58). The possibility of 
using RentBerry to “create a rental application and use it until you’re home” (RentBerry 2017) 
is an effect of this code-based control (Andersson Schwarz 2017). Through completing a rental 
application, prospective tenants disclose significant amounts of data about themselves 
including their job, education, roommates, social media profiles, credit reports, and feedback 
from previous landlords, which RentBerry analyzes with artificial intelligence and natural 
language processing to provide an overall recommendation for each tenant (AI Business 2016). 
The promise of transparency and control characteristic of digital real estate platforms turns on 
data generated in the process of use, including the very tools by which user groups perform 
transparency and control, e.g. dashboards, valuation tools, and calculators. Such data 
collection is a condition of using platforms, and is central both to how they frame their added 
value to users, and to building the market value of the platform itself. 
 
Indeed, 21st century capitalism is defined by “data-as-capital” (Sadowski 2019, 2), and platforms 
have emerged as the business model best suited to serving as “an extractive apparatus for 
data” (Srnicek 2017, 63). Once extracted, data capital can be used to create value by profiling 
and managing people and things (Sadowski, 2019). The key condition of use for digital 
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platforms—large-scale harvesting of data—enables standardization through deploying a set of 
categories shared across all users, in turn making it possible to classify (or profile) users 
(Bowker and Star 2000). Thus, the ‘fields’ a prospective tenant might fill out to create their 
application on RentBerry (and similar platforms such as Biddwell, based in Canada) underpin 
the ability to profile the “recommended tenant”, or to offer “intelligent predictive pairing” of 
tenants and listings. Invisibly shaping “how objects and content are organized and circulated” 
(Star and Bowker 2006; Easterling 2014, 13), standardization and classification are central to 
how platforms’ data extraction capabilities work as a form of power/knowledge that govern 
everyday life (Sadowski, 2019).  
 
The way digital real estate platforms collect standardized information and use it to measure, 
sort and rank people, properties, and markets creates what Fourcade and Healy (2013) term 
classification situations. Here, categories such as the (un)recommended tenant or the 
(un)worthy investment carry economic rewards and punishments that contribute to socio-spatial 
stratification. The tendency for market institutions to classify in this way is not new, as the history 
of mortgage market redlining in the US illustrates (Fourcade and Healy 2013). What is new is 
the “information dragnet” by which data is continuously captured at a scope and depth not 
previously possible and by a range of institutions beyond the state, the automation of 
classification and its extension to new settings and markets, the ability to follow people or 
entities across different networks and platforms to build a more complete picture, and of course 
data’s value generating possibilities (Fourcade and Healy 2017; Sadowski 2019). For example, 
data platforms like HouseCanary provide valuation and market forecasting tools for specific 
properties and markets by using machine learning to sift through data sources that include 
assessor records and property listing services as well as search and social media data, 
mortgage records, capital markets data, and more. HouseCanary depends on the information 
dragnet to build its dataset, but with data on 100 million properties, it also helps constitute the 
information dragnet, offering up multiple data products designed for homebuyers, appraisers, 
lenders, real estate agents, and investors. 
 
It is necessary to look critically at processes of data collection and classification underway 
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within platform real estate. Key considerations here include social, political, and historical 
contexts; contingent consequences; and whose interests are served (Dalton, Taylor, and 
Thatcher 2016; Fourcade and Healy 2017; Pasquale 2015). For example, digital real estate 
platforms are deeply intertwined with the capitalist norms of private property (Rogers 2017a), 
and are often situated in imperial and settler-societies where the wealth accumulation 
associated with property ownership is defined by longer histories of racialized dispossession 
(Keenan 2015). For example, this historical context is crucial to understanding how the user 
data amassed by Facebook enables a “process of sorting and slotting people” (Fourcade and 
Healy 2017, 14) to create racially disparate experiences of ads for housing and mortgages on 
Facebook Marketplace (Fields 2019b) that reinforce existing patterns of advantage and 
disadvantage. Classificatory systems reflect structural biases in society and involve issues of 
control over and access to information, (mis)representation, and inclusion and exclusion 
(Noble 2018).  
 
Furthermore, whiteness is “embedded in the infrastructure and design” of digital technologies 
(Daniels 2013, 696) and the tech industry more broadly (Sandvig et al. 2016; US Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission 2016), wherein historical colonial legacies can be 
leveraged to forge “ongoing market value for Western platform capitalist enterprises” (Dal Maso 
et al. 2019: 13). This context makes it likely (but not given) that digital real estate platforms are 
uploading twentieth century real estate ideologies into twenty-first century information 
technologies (Rogers 2017a), i.e. serving the interests of people and places already benefiting 
from property-led accumulation, while simultaneously neglecting or undermining the interests 
of marginalized people and places. 
 
As a conceptual tool, platform logic facilitates looking closely at the dynamics that both enable 
and result from the possibilities of platform real estate. It points toward investigation of how use 
of individual real estate platforms requires acquiescing to control rooted in their technical 
structure and design, and the wider operation of the information dragnet comprised by the wider 
interconnectivity of platforms (real estate and otherwise). Such work might entail, inter alia, the 
study of how platform interfaces support the classification of people, housing, and 
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neighborhoods; possibilities for designing platforms that work against the dominant political 
economy of housing; and the interconnectivity of different real estate platforms and the flows of 
data between them.  
Conceptual entry point 2: Digital labor  
Whereas understanding platform real estate in terms of platform logic entails a focus on the 
power and politics that are embedded within the seemingly neutral digital infrastructures, we 
now align our analytical attention on questions relating to labor. While there are many 
theories of labor and value that could be applied to platform real estate, such as 
anthropological theories of value, we outline three intersecting ways of using digital labor in 
analyses of platform real estate from the Marxist tradition. The first is unwaged digital labor 
(Scholz 2013), or the “immaterial labor” (Lazzarato 1997) that exploits the users’ “cognitive 
surplus” (Shirky 2010) to produce cultural products with economic value (i.e. commodities, 
see: Scholz 2013, 2). The second is the digitally-mediated waged labor associated with the 
shift of labor markets to the internet  (Kenney and Zysman 2016; Scholz 2013; De Stefano 
2015). This includes ‘free’ public sector data and the government-funded labor required to 
produce it. The third is automation and the illusion that there is a form of non-human-labor 
that is producing real estate data, such as the operation of artificial intelligence, algorithms 
and sensors in the internet of things (Srnicek 2017).  
Platform real estate analyses using these three theories of digital labor are useful because 
they move us well beyond a technical analyse of platform real estate by rendering more 
visible the broader socio-technical arrangements that produce these digital systems. 
Understanding these broader socio-technical arrangements is important because the labor 
that is used within these digital systems, which is sometimes called digital labor, is a form of 
relational power that can be used to empower or exploit, to oppress or to organize. Analysing 
how and why different groups use their digital labor reveals the ways ideology, policy, 
economics, and legal and cultural practices are reproduced in technical form by the makers 
and users of platform real estate.  
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When a real estate actor—whether a property owner, tenant, sales agent or investor—is 
asked to expend their digital labor to engage with or participate in a real estate (trans)action 
they are drawn into established property market relations and contexts. For example, in 
Australia, it is increasingly common for Australian’s to search for a house to purchase or a 
property to rent on a real estate platform such as Domain.com.au, which is an Australian 
digital property portal and real-estate business. Specific rights and entitlements are afforded 
to or withheld from Australian users of the platform in the process. These rights and 
entitlements are based on government policy and legislation, which have been translated into 
digital code, such as the right to secure a pathway to homeownership via private property 
(e.g. as a real estate buyer on Domain.com.au) or the inability to maintain housing security as 
a rental tenant (e.g. as a rent seeker on Domain.com.au). Cases like Domain.com.au show 
that real estate rights, obligations, and limitations are rarely established by the technical 
capacities, algorithms or coding schemas of digital technologies themselves, instead they are 
part of the broader socio-technical arrangements within which platform real estate is 
produced. Real estate rights and exclusions are established, maintained, protected, and 
defended by nation-states, local and global real estate companies, rental managers, property 
owners and others with vested interests in the protection of private property and rentier forms 
of capitalism, but digital labor of one form or another is often required to reproduce them in 
digital form.  
An obvious way of theorizing this notion of digital labor is via Marx’s (2013 [1867]) labor 
theory of value, with its associated ideas of labor exploitation and relations of production. 
Marx’s insights show that digital technologies did not give birth to property or capital, nor free 
or waged labor and its exploitation (Ross 2013, 23). Rather, Marxist inspired digital labour 
theory provides a set of analytical tools that can show how the designers of platform real 
estate are utilizing property, capital and labour in their platforms. Deploying a Marxist notion 
of digital labor in an analysis allows the researcher to move beyond the technicality of the real 
estate technology—such as an analysis of Domain.com.au as an ideological-free piece of 
technical software—to expose the technology as value-ridden and yet another site of Marxist 
exploitation. In broad terms, a Marxist analysis of Domain.com.au, located at the 
intersections of labor, commodities, property, rent and the rentier, would show that this digital 
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real estate technology is not a causal agent, at least not in it’s own right, but rather would 
show how Domain.com.au transmits the longstanding capitalist relations Marx was interested 
in via a new digital technology.  
More specifically, an analysis of the unwaged digital labor on Domain.com.au would expose 
the supposedly ‘free’ labor undertaken by users of a digital platform without the expectation or 
realization of financial remuneration. This could include adding personal information about 
how much a person is willing to spend to purchase a property or pay in rent. As Sadowski 
(2019) reminds us, data “is not out there waiting to be discovered as if it already exists” (p. 2), 
it is produced through labor. But the way people labor on behalf of large tech companies (e.g., 
Google, Facebook, Amazon) is different to the labor expended on digital real estate platforms 
(e.g., Domain.com.au), because what is at stake in the conditions of exchange is different. 
Real estate is not pursued for leisure, though investors might derive pleasure from buying, 
selling and renting property, and indeed, these activities may strongly influence their 
subjectivity and define their identity. Domain.com.au collects data from the users’ real estate 
and rental search behavior and sells it on to real estate sales agents to help them to design 
their sales strategies. For example, this user behavior could include using the platform to filter 
search results by suburb, sales or rent price, or property type; but Domain.com.au also 
collects data on when and how many times a potential customer accesses a real estate sales 
listing. These data (and more) are combined to make predictions about the kinds of properties 
potential investors are and are not interested in acquiring, the most appealing and 
unappealing markets, and demand for particular properties or suburbs.  
 
Thus, the activities carried out on real estate platforms—regardless of whether they result in a 
transaction—produce data that helps to generate value in these companies (Dal Maso et al. 
2019). In the aggregate, such information may help to shape the platform’s strategy about 
what kinds of markets to expand into, withdraw from, or avoid. Real estate platforms thus 
derive value by extracting data that is generated from user labor, which they can be refined by 
drawing in other data sources, e.g., data on real estate sales and local market rents (Rogers 
2017b; Sadowski 2019). Analyzing the use of unwaged digital labor in platform real estate 
provides one way of understanding the types of data that are being generated by these 
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companies, and how this data is used to create company value. Another way is to analyze the 
use of waged digital labor by these companies.      
 
Waged digital labor, which is sometimes called gig economy labor, often consists of the labor 
that is associated with incumbent industries or businesses that are newly mediated by 
platforms. Consider work-on-demand, where “traditional working activities... are offered and 
assigned through mobile apps”, and businesses offering the work set standards for and 
manage workers who complete tasks locally (De Stefano 2015, 5). Familiar to many through 
platforms such as the ridesharing app Uber, work-on-demand is increasingly common to 
digital real estate platforms. In 2016, the Domain Group (i.e., Domain.com.au) acquired a 
35% or A$15 million stake in OneFlare.com.au. Oneflare is a digital platform that connects 
Domain customers with local trade service providers, such as plumbers or electricians. 
Another example of this type of work-on-demand model is TaskEasy in the US, which allows 
property owners to outsource yard care to contractors. The TaskEasy platform “handles 
customer marketing and acquisition, job scheduling, daily routing, billing and other business 
functions” on behalf of established yard care businesses, or contractors who may be working 
part-time for extra money, or cobbling together income from multiple tasking platforms 
(TaskEasy 2019). TaskEasy manages contractors through the smartphone app they are 
required to use. The aim is to cut labor costs through automating driving routes to jobs and 
using metadata with time and location stamps as an audit trail to target fraud and inefficiency 
(Fields 2019a). In this case, “the platform operator has unprecedented control over the 
compensation for and organization of work, while still claiming to be only an intermediary” 
(Kenney and Zysman 2016, 62).  
 
Thus analyzing the use of outsourced waged labor, much like the analysis of unwaged digital 
labor, can expose the types of data that are being generated by these companies, but it also 
raises questions about the digital control and regulation of labor. The outsourcing of rental 
maintenance to work-on-demand contractors might come with the erosion of employment 
benefits and employment security, or the fragmentation of work schedules, or the curtailing of 
bargaining power. Centralizing real estate transactions and associated services on their 
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platform, via work-on-demand or similar models, allows these real estate tech companies to 
both disperse with any formal commitments to worker rights and protections while 
simultaneously capturing some of the value of the work-on-demand businesses who use their 
platform; all of which builds value in the real estate platform company (Kenney and Zysman 
2016; Pasquale 2016; Staab and Nachtwey 2016). 
 
This labor outsourcing, and the platform economy more broadly, is often build on public 
investment, government-funded labor and public sector data (Srnicek 2017; Mazzucato 
2015). Therefore, analyzing the roles that governments play in collecting and sometimes 
digitizing real estate and financial data is a third modality of digital labor inquiry. While 
government data pertaining to property holdings, urban planning, land records, and so forth, 
are utilized by tech companies in their real estate platforms (Keenan 2015), the governments’ 
data collection and processing often runs silently in the background. Thus, the government, 
government policy and the law are integral to the structures that enable platform real estate to 
function and to be profitable. A government department might be the provider of tax-payer 
funded labor to produce digital data, or they may act as a real estate, financial, planning and 
other data collector. For example, data platform HouseCanary in the US uses a range of 
publicly available data to help develop the comprehensive, granular, nationwide dataset 
powering its valuation, forecasting, and appraisal products. The platform adds value to the 
public data by standardizing the notoriously fragmented local data characteristic of the US, 
thereby creating products that may be sold back to public sector clients or sold on to new 
private sector clients. Therefore, interrogating the labor value of data can expose the complex 
public-private structures that enable platform real estate.  
 
In the state of New South Wales (NSW) in Australia, the NSW Land Title Registry records 
freehold land titles that underwrite the real estate market in the state. The privatization of the 
land registry in 2017 sparked public debate about the private sector operator’s ability—which 
is majority owned by superannuation and infrastructure financing companies—to keep this 
critical data secure and to use this public data in ethical ways. In this case, there were strong 
calls for the government to continue to fund and administer the registry (i.e., fund and oversee 
 
 
  
20 
the human labor) on security and accountability grounds. The Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System in the US is another example (Keenan 2015). Analyzing these types of 
cases with a focus on government-funded labor can expose the ways in which the state is 
acting as a data creator and/or provider to private sector technology companies. This type of 
analysis raises different ethical questions about labor, accountability and the security of 
platform real estate data.   
 
Finally, the work of algorithms and the automation of some real estate practises and 
operational tasks are almost certainly affecting the roles of those who work in the real estate 
and services industries in ways that can be analysed by digital labor theory too. Algorithms 
and automation are central to contemporary conversations about digital labor, popularly 
(mis)framed in terms of robots taking jobs from humans (see Kishan, Son, and Rojanasakul 
2017 "Robots are coming for these Wall Street jobs"; Kolhatkar 2017 “Welcoming our new 
robot overlords”). So profound is the work of algorithms in the platform economy that “it is no 
exaggeration to say that software was formerly embedded in things, but now things—services 
as well as objects—are woven into software-based network fabrics” (Kenney and Zysman 
2016, 64).  
In the housing space, work on algorithms and the automation is useful for showing how labor 
obsolescence is being produced by digitizing and moving online some of the more routine 
everyday practices of tenancy management. For example, Rently in the US automates the 
process of showing vacant rental properties by allowing prospective tenants to use a lock-box 
code sent to their smartphone to access and view properties themselves, thereby reducing 
the need for leasing agents. Platform real estate is exposing tenancy management to a form 
of digital rationalisation, wherein each step in the tenancy management process is 
understood as an instrumental task that might possibly be checked off by a rental 
management algorithm, introducing a “new kind of distributed labor [that] does not need to be 
performed by payroll employees” (Ross 2013, 20). But this is not always the case. Unlike 
Rently, prestige real estate brokers Sotheby’s (2019; n.p.) suggest their high-end real estate 
services are “tailored through technology” but their service still relies on interpersonal, face-
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to-face relations; thus gender, class and race are likely to significantly influence the way 
automation is rolled out and its effects.  
The work of algorithms can also be seen through the preponderance of dashboards and other 
reporting systems in platform real estate, like Mynd, a property management platform 
promising landlords “rich, up-to-the-minute data on maintenance updates to rental income 
status and beyond. You’ll be a tap and swipe away from your rental properties, the same way 
you are with your stock market and other investments” (2017, n.p.). Automation is thus 
fundamentally transforming once people-heavy real estate services in a variety of ways 
across different markets and housing communities. And as note above, the level of labor 
transition and/or automation is likely to vary across different types of markets (e.g., by asset 
class) and tenure groups (e.g., by social class), and digital labor theory can help us to find 
and analyze these differences.  
 
Therefore, the three theories of digital labor outlined above allow us to show how the broader 
socio-technical arrangements that produce platform real estate are subsequently 
(re)configuring the human labor within the sphere of real estate practice. Digital labor theory 
provides a set of conceptual tools to investigate different socio-technical arrangements and the 
types of human labor and real estate practice that have been coded into them, including those 
that resist and subvert capitalist interests. Just as digital laborers in other economic spheres 
have used platforms to organize labor actions and resistance (see Woodcock 2017 on worker 
resistance in the gig economy), real estate actors may also use their labor subversively. For 
example, Justfix.nyc is a platform that assists New York City tenants to document their housing 
issues in an effort to better manage their disputes with landlords or to support their legal actions 
(Schwartz 2016). Digital platforms can also be used to organize worker-owned cooperatives 
(Scholz 2016). Such examples remind us that digital labor relations are not fixed, but subject to 
struggle, meaning it is not inevitable that they reproduce capitalist exploitation. 
Conceptual entry point 3: Financialization  
A focus on financialization entails asking how digital platforms may govern and reshape 
geographies of real estate investment and flows of finance capital, and how they may enable 
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the development of new financial instruments based on real estate, or otherwise help integrate 
real estate into global financial markets. These questions call upon us to engage with critical 
accounts of housing and political economy under financialized capitalism (Aalbers and 
Christophers 2014; Aalbers 2016; Fernandez and Aalbers 2016), logistics (Bernes 2013; 
Cowen 2014; Danyluk 2017), and digital economic circulation (Langley and Leyshon 2017; 
Srnicek 2017). We highlight three areas for investigation based on this interdisciplinary body of 
work. First, the role of platforms in facilitating capital circulation and surplus capital absorption, 
either by sinking capital into the development of platforms themselves or by governing the 
deployment of capital to invest in real estate as a commodity. Second, how platforms may work 
to coordinate and secure capital turnover. Third, the way platforms potentially help constitute 
real estate as a financial asset class. While we treat these ideas separately for practical 
purposes, they are of course interlinked. 
 
The first area of investigation--how platforms may facilitate capital circulation and surplus 
capital absorption, requires a brief history of platform capitalism (see Srnicek 2017 for a more 
comprehensive account). An important factor for our purposes is the post-1970s buildup of a 
“global wall of money” associated with the growth of assets managed by institutional investors 
and the trade surpluses of emerging economies, loose monetary policy, and the expansion of 
corporate profits held in offshore tax havens (Fernandez and Aalbers 2016). In the 1990s the 
U.S. telecommunications sector “became the favoured outlet” for this wall of money, which both 
developed the physical infrastructure for commercial internet (making today’s digital economy 
possible) and created a speculative bubble that burst in 2001. (Srnicek, 2017, 20). Soon after, 
financial instruments based on mortgage debt became a key site for absorbing investment 
capital, once again creating a speculative bubble—this time in the interlinked housing and 
financial markets—that burst in 2008 (Newman 2009; Soederberg 2014). States responded by 
holding interest rates close to zero for nearly a decade (Fleming 2015); the ensuing reduction 
of investment returns pushed capital toward riskier strategies, including private equity and 
venture capital, and into property to escape stock market volatility (Ivory, Protess, and Bennett 
2016; Mooney 2016; Srnicek 2017).  
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Since 2008, investment capital—particularly venture capital—has flowed into tech companies 
with platform business models based on recent advances in technology (such as automation, 
cloud computing, and the like, see Langley and Leyshon 2017; Srnicek 2017). At the same 
time, the crisis was reimagined as a real estate investment opportunity, with price declines and 
a proliferation of distressed assets drawing capital on the hunt for yield (Beswick et al. 2016; 
Fields 2018; Rogers 2017a). Because the post-2008 tech boom coincided with the housing 
bust, real estate platforms can soak up surplus capital in two ways: directing it first toward 
property investments and second into the development of platforms that “disrupt” the traditional 
real estate industry.  
 
Trading platforms illustrate these twofold dynamics of surplus capital absorption. In 2017, real 
estate brokerage platform Compass became one of the first “proptech unicorns”, indicating a 
valuation of $1 billion US or more (Armstrong 2017). Between 2014 and 2018, Compass raised 
$1.2 billion US, with recent sizable investment by the Qatar Investment Authority and the 
SoftBank Vision Fund (Crunchbase 2019a). Similarly, Opendoor, another unicorn, raised over 
$1 billion US in just four years with a model of automating home sales by bidding on homes 
sight unseen, agreeing to buy them after an inspection, and then reselling them at a markup 
(Crunchbase 2019b; Loizos 2017). Such well-capitalized trading platforms are still rare; more 
typical is Roofstock (for buying and selling occupied rental properties), which since 2015 has 
raised $75.3 million from venture capital funds (Crunchbase 2019c). Discourses of progress 
about the transformative impact of digital platforms on real estate transactions accompany all 
these business models. For example, Roofstock (2017) argues single-family rental “is an 
industry ripe for disruption...Roofstock turns the old way of investing on its head, bringing 
transparency and efficiency to create a better way to transact...enabling investors to treat their 
real estate investments more like stock portfolios” (emphasis added). Yet such surplus capital 
absorption strategies can lead to speculative booms and busts that affect people on the ground 
more adversely than the architects of such strategies. 
 
We further suggest that platforms contribute to coordinating and securing capital turnover. That 
is, they serve a logistical purpose by organizing “capital in technical ways that aim to make 
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every step of its ‘turnover’ productive” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, 12). Logistics governs and 
coordinates supply chains to afford the circulation of commodities (Danyluk 2017; Bernes 
2013). The “seemingly banal and technocratic” nature of logistics can obscure its politics, i.e. 
remaking space on behalf of regimes of capital accumulation that reinforce unequal power 
relations (Cowen 2014, 4; Chua et al. 2018). Thus, while commonly referring to the role of 
transport and communications in calibrating the physical flow of goods, today logistics is better 
understood as a fundamental logic of contemporary capitalism: “a calculative rationality and 
suite of spatial practices aimed at facilitating circulation” (Chua et al., 2018, 618; see also 
Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013).  
 
Real estate platforms embody this principle of circulatory, frictionless flow. For example, data 
platform HouseCanary (2017) offers property valuation and forecasting at multiple geographical 
scales (down to the block level), using artificial intelligence and machine learning to “see into 
the future of real estate” and “make better, faster, real estate decisions with technology” 
(emphasis added). Similarly, the race by platforms like Opendoor to enable home buying with 
just a few clicks seeks to accelerate real estate investment (Casselman and Dougherty 2019). 
The effort to align the speed of investments in homes with that of information transmission 
speaks to an ideal of “eliminating friction and resistance” from capital turnover, even in the case 
of a notoriously ‘sticky’ commodity like residential real estate (Mezzadra and Neilson 2015, 7; 
Bernes 2013). It is worth asking questions about whose purposes are served by this ideal of 
speed, and the extent to which it may actually undermine the historical stability of real estate 
investment and the political economies that stability underwrites (Casselman and Dougherty 
2019). 
 
Operational platforms such as Rently (automated keyless entry to vacant rental properties) and 
SMS Assist (property maintenance) also appeal to the notion of unimpeded capital turnover. 
Their calculative capabilities add value and maximize profit through offering data and analytics. 
For example, Rently not only reduces labor costs (maximizing the productivity of leasing agents 
by enlisting prospective tenants in the work of viewing rental properties); it enables property 
management companies and owners of rental portfolios to make decisions based on data (e.g. 
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reports of inquiries, showings, and feedback), and allows properties to be shown more 
frequently and efficiently by automating this process. SMS Assist generates data with which 
owners can monitor how long maintenance jobs take, flag problem tenants, and inform 
investment decisions. These value-adding capabilities point to how the logistical uses of 
platform real estate also entail power relations (Cowen 2014). Consider, for example, how the 
ability to verify the billable hours of a contractor against metadata from the app used to check 
in and out of maintenance jobs introduces new modes of surveillance into the embodied 
activities of workers (Fields 2019a). The politics of platform real estate logistics demand critical 
inquiry. 
  
Finally, we suggest platforms may help constitute real estate as a financial asset class and 
allow for the “penetration” of financial instruments “into new areas of society” (Jacobs and Manzi 
2019: 2). Platforms simultaneously work on the subjectivities of investors to reinforce 
understandings of homes as assets, and create data that underpins financial assets. The 
standardized data generated through use of the platform, for example as tenants pay rent or 
submit maintenance requests through resident portals, is presented through dashboards and 
analytics that measure, sort, and rank. Trading and data platforms encourage a similar 
calculative mentality. For example trading platform Entera uses artificial intelligence to match 
single-family rental properties with an investor-specified profile (such as gentrifying 
neighborhoods in the Midwest) and to promise confident investments. Such capabilities change 
the embodied experience of investment decisions through how property and place are made 
visible. In the terms of social studies of finance, platforms afford calculative agency to define 
and value goods (Çalışkan and Callon 2010; Jacobs and Manzi 2019).  
 
Calculative agency is vital to creating, marketing, and monitoring financial assets such as the 
rent-backed financial instruments recently rolled out by corporate landlords managing large 
portfolios of single-family rental homes in the US. Because single-family rental homes were 
never previously been owned or managed at scale, much less been the site of structured 
finance opportunities, historical market performance data was essentially non-existent before 
2009 (Fields 2018).  Real estate platforms can provide crucial information with which credit 
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rating agencies and bondholders can evaluate the new instruments, thus providing the 
“transparency and comparability” (Bitterer and Heeg 2012, n.p.) necessary to the development 
of new real estate asset classes, and their reception by investors. Platform real estate stands 
to cultivate new sensibilities of investment that align with financialization, and to generate 
information that materially supports this process. 
 
Real estate platforms are predominantly with the aim of enhancing the exchange value of 
housing. This reality suggests the possibility they will reinforce the political economy of housing 
under financialized capitalism by supporting the central role of housing in capital circulation, 
enabling the continued absorption of the global wall of money into property, nurturing ideologies 
and practices of housing chiefly as a vehicle for capital accumulation. As such, financialization 
is a crucial conceptual tool for analyzing platform real estate.  
 
Conclusions 
As Maarbani  (2017) argues, “new technologies are reimagining every aspect of the way in 
which real estate is procured, developed, managed and utilised” (p.1): the industry’s new 
battleground is real estate tech and the data capital being mobilised in excess of the bricks and 
mortar of actual properties (Fields 2019a; Rogers 2017b; Sadowski 2019). Digital platforms for 
real estate trading, operations, and data are a crucial mechanism for the changes Maarbani 
(2017) describes. Platforms are a longstanding object of inquiry in media studies (see Plantin 
et al. 2018 for an overview) and, more recently, in social science (e.g. Rosenblat 2018; van 
Dijck, Poell, and Waal 2018; van Doorn 2017; Wachsmuth and Weisler 2018), where a handful 
of geographers and urban scholars have begun to attend to the interplay of platforms and real 
estate (e.g. Dal Maso et al. 2019; Fields 2017; Rogers 2017a; Shaw 2018).  
 
Though the field of housing studies is well-placed to shape a theoretical and analytic agenda 
around platform real estate, a conceptual vocabulary has yet to give shape to such an 
agenda. It is vital for housing scholars to recognize and interrogate digital transformations of 
housing and home. In this article we have contributed three entry points to guide critical 
inquiry into platform real estate: platform logic, digital labor, and financialization. While by no 
means complete, the initial conceptual vocabulary we have set out in this article provides 
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fertile ground for housing scholars to generate new, interdisciplinary insights about platform 
real estate. Below, we detail a range of ways housing scholars could apply the concepts 
outlined in this article to elaborate on the classificatory and calculative aspects of real estate 
platforms, the role of data as capital (cf. Sadowski 2019), how platforms may restructure real 
estate industry roles, and the political economy of real estate platforms. 
 
Platform logic, drawn from work on the sociology of media, encourages housing scholars to 
analyze the affordances of platforms in terms of underlying ‘code-based control’ (Andersson 
Schwarz 2017, 6) at the level of individual platforms, and the role of data capital in the 
classificatory work of the wider platform ecosystem. Here, housing scholars might investigate: 
the basis and consequences of tenant categorization tools; the circulation and repurposing of 
data on users, houses, and places between different platforms and data brokers, and; how 
users perceive the tradeoffs associated with real estate platforms.  
 
Attending to digital labor in the context of platform real estate opens up a wealth of questions. 
These include how automation may make some forms of labor by real estate professionals 
obsolete while creating new industry roles; the private commodification of public sector data 
produced via government-funded labor; dynamics of surveillance and control over precarious 
gig economy workers, and; the status of platform use as unwaged digital labor that generates 
data with which platform operators can derive value.  
 
While the dynamics of financialization have been analysed extensively in housing studies, 
platform real estate is an important new component of these dynamics. Of particular interest is: 
the role of venture capital in shaping platform real estate business models (see Langley and 
Leyshon, 2017, on how platforms ‘perform’ the structure of VC investment); the investment 
patterns and processes platforms engender—including management at a distance by everyday 
investors, and; the potential for platforms to provide the calculative tools and data needed to 
underpin novel asset classes (see Fields, 2019 on this process in the U.S. rental market).  
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Across this set of conceptual tools, we have emphasized the importance of a historicised stance 
and resisting the urge to endorse technological determinism. We can do this, we argue, by 
attending to social, cultural, political and economic relations, rather than conceptualising 
platform real estate solely in technological terms. Real estate actors are not “passive data 
subjects” (Isin and Ruppert 2015, 4), and technologies taken in isolation do not have causal 
agency (Ross 2013). Platform real estate is not separable from the social contexts in which it 
emerges. Just as these contexts are not fixed, neither are the subjectivities of digital real estate 
actors, nor the uses and consequences of platform real estate. Critical housing scholars must 
therefore not only investigate and verify the extent to which real estate platforms exacerbate 
housing as a vector of inequality, but seek out counter-examples of platforms that pursue 
housing justice. For example, radical digital housing practices may deploy digital technologies 
to document dispossession (e.g. the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project), supply data to explore the 
impacts of platform real estate (e.g. Inside Airbnb), or provide tools tenants may use to organize 
and take action against landlords (e.g. Justfix.nyc). Such practices seek to work against 
dominant ideologies of housing that privilege “private property ownership, market allocation 
mechanisms and accumulation strategies” (Aalbers and Christophers 2014, 384).  
 
In a 21st century echo of the impacts of the early 17th century invention of the surveyor’s chain 
(see Shaw , 2018), the advances associated with Tech Boom 2.0—including cloud and 
mobile computing, digital platforms, and automated, data-driven decision-making tools—are 
dramatically reshaping how housing is bought and sold by homeowners and investors 
(Casselman and Dougherty 2019), operated by landlords (Fields 2019a) and inhabited by us 
all (Maalsen and Sadowski 2019).  Yet there is a continuity as well as a rupturing (or 
disruption in tech language) associated with the digitization of real estate (Rogers 2017b). 
Existing social, cultural, political and economic structures often change more slowly than 
technology, generating novel interactions among platform real estate and ‘old’ housing 
questions, such as those concerning real estate citizenship and property-owning democracies 
that so dominated nations like the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia in the 20th 
century (Rogers 2017a). Platforms are, therefore, set to play a key role in (re)producing 
housing markets and underwriting their distributional consequences—for better or worse, 
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making it vital for critical housing scholars to build knowledge about this digitization of real 
estate practice.   
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